![]() ![]() 4th DCA 2013), and as such, it is prohibited in all but the most exceptional cases, Near v. 2d DCA 1996) (citations omitted).Ī temporary injunction aimed at speech, as it is here, "is a classic example of prior restraint on speech triggering First Amendment concerns," Vrasic v. A temporary injunction is an "extraordinary remedy" that should be granted "sparingly and only after the moving party has alleged and proved facts entitling to relief." Liberty Fin. A restraining order disturbs the status quo and impinges on the exercise of editorial discretion." In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1351 (1st Cir.1986), modified on other grounds on reh'g by 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir.), cert. is to publish news promptly that editors decide to publish. In the context of the media, "the status quo. "The primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo while the merits of the underlying dispute are litigated." Manatee Cnty. 2 On May 15, 2013, this court stayed the order granting the motion for temporary injunction pending the resolution of this appeal. The court did not make any findings at the hearing or in its written order to support its decision. ![]() Following a hearing, the circuit court issued an order on April 25, 2012, granting the motion for temporary injunction. Bollea filed a motion for temporary injunction seeking to enjoin Gawker Media and others not participating in this appeal 1 from publishing and otherwise distributing the video excerpts from the sexual encounter and complementary written report. Thereafter and as he did in federal court, Mr. Bollea filed an amended complaint in state circuit court, asserting essentially the same claims that he asserted in federal court. ![]() Bollea voluntarily dismissed the federal action. Bollea otherwise failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to a preliminary injunction under the applicable injunction standard. The court found that the requested preliminary injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First Amendment and that notwithstanding the First Amendment issue, Mr. Following a hearing, the federal court issued an order on November 14, 2012, denying the motion for preliminary injunction. Bollea filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the named defendants from publishing any portion of or any content from the Sex Tape. Bollea initiated an action in federal court by filing a multicount complaint against Gawker Media and others, asserting claims for invasion of privacy, publication of private facts, violation of the right of publicity, and infliction of emotional distress. Gawker Media maintains that it was not responsible for creating the Sex Tape and that it received a copy of the Sex Tape from an anonymous source for no compensation. Bollea maintains that he never consented to the Sex Tape's release or publication. On or about October 4, 2012, Gawker Media posted a written report about the extramarital affair on its website, including excerpts of the videotaped sexual encounter ("Sex Tape"). Bollea's consent or knowledge, the sexual encounter was videotaped. Bollea engaged in extramarital sexual relations with a woman in her home. Because the temporary injunction is an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First Amendment, we reverse. Bollea is collaterally estopped from seeking the same relief previously sought and decisively denied in federal court, and should the doctrine of collateral estoppel be inapplicable, that such relief is an unconstitutional prior restraint. On appeal, Gawker Media challenges the circuit court's order, asserting that Mr. Bollea's motion for temporary injunction, though it did not articulate the reasons for doing so. Terry Bollea sought to enjoin Gawker Media, LLC, from publishing and otherwise distributing the written report about his extramarital affair that includes video excerpts from the sexual encounter.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |